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JURISDICTION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS
Section 78-4-11 Provides that the Court of Appeals shall hear all appeals
from the Circuit courts:
Except as otherwise directed by Section 78-2-2,
appeals from final civil and criminal judgments of
the circuit courts are to the Court of Appeals. . .
None of the exceptions listed in Section 78-2-2 U.C.A., 1953, apply to this
case.

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
POINT ONE
THE STATE FAILED TO CARRY ITS BURDEN OF PROOF
THAT DEFENDANT COULD NOT DRIVE SAFELY BECAUSE
OF INTOXICATION

ii
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POINT TWO
THE COURT ERRED IN DENYING DEFENDANT A JURY
TRIAL

DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL AND
STATUTORY PROVISIONS
U. S. Constitution, Amendment VI: In all criminal prosecutions,
the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by
an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall
have been committed, which district shall have been previously
ascertained by law, and to be informed of the nature and cause of
the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to
have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor and
to have the Assistance of counsel for his defense.
Utah State Constitution, Article I, Section 10: In capital cases the
right to trial by jury shall remain inviolate. In courts of general
jurisdiction, except in capital cases, a jury shall consist of eight
jurors. In courts of inferior jurisdiction a jury shall consist of four
jurors. In criminal cases the verdict shall be unanimous. In civil
cases three-fourths of the jurors may find a verdict. A jury in civil
cases shall be waived unless demanded.
Utah State Constitution, Article I, Section 12: In criminal
prosecutions the accused shall have the right to appear and defend
in person and by counsel, to demand the nature and cause of the
accusation against him, to have a copy thereof, to testify in his own
behalf, to be confronted by the witnesses against him, to have
compulsory process to compel the attendance of witnesses in his
own behalf, to have a speedy public trial by an impartial jury of
the county or district in which the offense is alleged to have been
committed, and the right to appeal in all cases. In no instance
shall any accused person, before final judgment, be compelled to
advance money or fees to secure the rights herein guaranteed, the
accused shall not be compelled to give evidence against himself; a
wife shall not be compelled to testify against her husband, nor a
husband against his wife, nor shall any person be twice put in
jeopardy for the same offense.
41-4-44 U.CA., 1990: (1) (a) It is unlawful and punishable as
provided in this section for any person to operate or be in actual
physical control of a vehicle within this state if the person has a
blood or breath alcohol concentration of .08 grams or greater as
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shown by a chemical test given within two hours after the alleged
operation or physical control, or if the person is under the
influence of alcohol or any drug or the combined influence of
alcohol and any drug to a degree which renders the person
incapable of safely operating a vehicle.
(b) The fact that a person charged with violating this
section is or has been legally entitled to use alcohol or a drug is
not a defense against any charge of violating this section.
(2) Alcohol concentration in the blood shall be based upon
grams of alcohol per 100 milliliters of blood, and alcohol
concentration in the breath shall be based upon grams of alcohol
per 210 liters of breath.
(3)
(a) Every person convicted the first time of a
violation of Subsection (1) is guilty of a class B misdemeanor. But
if the person has inflicted bodily injury upon another as a
proximate result of having operated the vehicle in a negligent
manner, he is guilty of a class A misdemeanor.
(b) In this section, the standard of negligence is that
of simple negligence, the failure to exercise the degree of care
which an ordinarily reasonable and prudent person exercises under
like or similar circumstances.
(4) In addition to any penalties imposed under Subsection
(3), the court shall, upon a first conviction impose a mandatory jail
sentence of not less than 48 consecutive hours nor more than 240
hours, with emphasis on serving in the drunk tank of the jail, or
require the person to work in a community-service work program
for not less than 24 hours nor more than 50 hours and, in addition
to the jail sentence or the work in the community-service work
program, order the person to participate in an assessment and
educational series at a licensed alcohol rehabilitation facility.
(5) Upon a second conviction within six years under this
section or under a local ordinance similar to this section adopted
in compliance with Subsection 41-6-43(1) the court shall, in addition
to any penalties imposed under Subsection (3), impose a mandatory
jail sentence of not less than 240 consecutive hours nor more than
720 hours, with emphasis on serving in the drunk tank of the jail,
or require the person to work in a community-service work
program for not less than 80 hours nor more than 240 hours and,
in addition to the jail sentence or the work in the communityservice work program, order the person to participate in an
assessment and educational series at a licensed alcohol
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rehabilitation facility. The court may, in its discretion, order the
person to obtain treatment at an alcohol rehabilitation facility.
(6)
(a) A third or subsequent conviction within six years
under this section or under a local ordinance similar to this section
adopted in compliance with Subsection 41-6-43(1) is a:
(i) class B misdemeanor if one or both of the
prior convictions is for an offense committed prior to April 23,
1990; and
(ii) class A misdemeanor if both of the prior
convictions are for offenses committed after April 23, 1990.
(b)
(i) Under Subsection 6(a)(i) the court shall,
in addition to any penalties imposed under Subsection (3), impose
a mandatory jail sentence of not less than 720 nor more than 2,160
hours, with emphasis on serving in the drunk tank of the jail.
(ii) The court may, as an alternative to jail,
require the person to work in a community-service work program
for not less than 240 nor more than 720 hours.
(iii) In addition to the jail sentence or work
in the community-service work program, the court shall order the
person to obtain treatment at an alcohol rehabilitation facility.
(c)
(i) Under Subsection 6(a)(ii) the court shall,
in addition to any penalties imposed under Subsection (3), impose
a fine of not less than $1,000, and also a mandatory jail sentence
of not less than 720 hours nor more than 2,160 hours, with
emphasis on serving in the drunk tank of the jail.
(ii) The court may, as an alternative to jail,
require the person to work in a community-service work program
for not less than 240 nor more than 720 hours, but only if the
court enters in writing on the record the reason it finds the
defendant should not serve the jail sentence. Enrollment in and
completion of a chemical dependency rehabilitation program
approved by the court may be a sentencing alternative to
incarceration or community service if the program provides
intensive care or inpatient treatment and long term closely
supervised follow through after the treatment.
(iii) In addition to the jail sentence or work
in the community-service work program, the court shall order the
person to obtain treatment at an alcohol rehabilitation facility.
v
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(7)
(a) A fourth or subsequent conviction within six years
under this section is a third degree felony if all three prior
convictions are for offenses committed after April 23, 1990.
(b) The court shall, in addition to
imposed under Subsection (3), impose a fine of
$1,000, and also a mandatory jail sentence of not
hours nor more than 2,160 hours, with emphasis on
drunk tank of the jail.

any penalties
not less than
less than 720
serving in the

(c) The court may, as an alternative to jail, require
the person to work in a community-service work program for not
less than 240 nor more than 720 hours, but only if the court enters
in writing on the record the reason it finds the defendant should
not serve the jail sentence. Enrollment in and completion of a
chemical dependency rehabilitation program approved by the court
may be a sentencing alternative to incarceration or community
service if the program provides intensive care or inpatient treatment
and long-term closely supervised follow through after treatment.
(d) In addition to the jail sentence or work in the
community-service work program, the court shall order the person
to obtain treatment at an alcohol rehabilitation facility.
(8) No portion of any sentence imposed under Subsection
(3) may be suspended and the convicted person is not eligible for
parole or probation until any sentence imposed under this section
has been served. Probation or parole resulting from a conviction
for a violation of this section or a local ordinance similar to this
section adopted in compliance with Subsection 41-6-43(1) may not
be terminated and the department may not reinstate any license
suspended or revoked as a result of the conviction, if it is a second
or subsequent conviction within six years, until the convicted person
has furnished evidence satisfactory to the department that all fines
and fees, including fees for restitution and rehabilitation costs,
assessed against the person, have been paid.
(9)
(a) The provisions of Subsections (4), (5), (6), and
(7) that require a sentencing court to order a convicted person to:
participate in an assessment and educational series at a licensed
alcohol rehabilitation facility; obtain, in the discretion of the court,
treatment, at an alcohol rehabilitation facility; obtain, mandatorily,
treatment at an alcohol rehabilitation facility; or do any
combination of those things, apply to a conviction for a violation
of Section 41-6-45 that qualifies as a prior offense under Subsection
(10). The court shall render the same order regarding education
or treatment at an alcohol rehabilitation facility, or both, in
connection with a first, second, or subsequent conviction under
Section 41-6-45 that qualifies as a prior offense under Subsection
vi
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(10), as the court would render in connection with applying
respectively, the first, second, or subsequent conviction requirements
of Subsections 41-6-44 (4), (5), (6) and (7).
(b) For purposes of determining whether a conviction
under Section 41-6-45 which qualified as a prior conviction under
Subsection (10), is a first, second, or subsequent conviction under
this subsection, a previous conviction under either this section or
Section 41-6-45 is considered a prior conviction.
(c) Any alcohol rehabilitation program and any
community-based or other education program provided for in this
section shall be approved by the Department of Human Services.
(10) (a) When the prosecution agrees to a plea of guilty
or no contest to a charge of a violation of Section 41-6-45 or of an
ordinance enacted under Subsection 41-6-43(1) in satisfaction of, or
as a substitute for, an original charge of a violation of this section,
the prosecution shall state for the record a factual basis for the
plea, including whether or not there has been consumption of
alcohol or drugs, or a combination of both, by the defendant in
connection with the offense. The statement is an offer of proof of
the facts which shows whether there was consumption of alcohol
or drugs, or a combination of both, by the defendant, in connection
with the offense.
(b) The court shall advise the defendant before
accepting the plea offered under this subsection of the
consequences of a violation of Section 41-6-45 as follows. If the
court accepts the defendant's plea of guilty or no contest to a
charge of violating Section 41-6-45, and the prosecutor states for
the record that there was consumption of alcohol or drugs, or a
combination of both, by the defendant in connection with the
offense, the resulting conviction is a prior offense for the purposes
of Subsections (5), (6), and (7).
(11) A peace officer may, without a warrant, arrest a person
for a violation of this section when the officer has probable cause
to believe the violation has occurred, although not in his presence,
and if the officer has probable cause to believe that the violation
was committed by the person.
(12) The Department of Public Safety shall suspend for 90
days the operator's license of any person convicted for the first
time under Subsection (1), and shall revoke for one year the
license of any person convicted of any subsequent offense under
Subsection (1) if the violation is committed within a period of six
years from the date of the prior violation. The department shall
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subtract from any suspension or revocation period the number of
days for which a license was previously suspended under Section
41-2-130, if the previous suspension was based on the same
occurrence upon which the record of conviction is based.
77-1-6 Utah Code Annotated, 1980: (1) In criminal prosecutions
the defendant is entitled:
(a)
To appear in person and defend in person or
by counsel;
(b)
To receive a copy of the accusation filed
against him;
(c)
To testify in his own behalf;
(d)
To be confronted by the witnesses against him;
(e)
To have compulsory process to insure the
attendance of witnesses in his behalf;
(f)
To a speedy public trial by an impartial jury
of the county or district where the offense is
alleged to have been committed;
(g) To the right of appeal in all cases; and
(h)
To be admitted to bail in accordance with
provisions of law, or be entitled to a trial
within 30 days after arraignment if unable to
post bail and if the business of the court
permits.
(2) In addition:
(a)
No person shall be put twice in jeopardy for
the same offense;
(b)
No accused person shall, before final judgment,
be compelled to advance money for fees to
secure rights guaranteed by the Constitution or
the laws of Utah, or to pay the costs of those
rights when received;
(c)
No person shall be compelled to give evidence
against himself;
(d)
A wife shall not be compelled to testify against
her husband nor a husband against his wife;
and
(e)
No person shall be convicted unless by verdict
of a jury, or upon a plea of guilty or no
contest, or upon a judgment of a court when
trial by jury has been waived or, in case of an
infraction, upon a judgment by a magistrate.
Rule 17, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, The Trial.
(a) In all cases the defendant shall have the right to appear
and defend in person and by counsel. The defendant shall be
personally present at the trial with the following exceptions:
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(1) In prosecutions of misdemeanors and infractions,
defendant may consent in writing to trial in his absence;
(2) In prosecutions for offenses not punishable by
death, the defendant's voluntary absence from the trial after notice
to defendant of the time for trial shall not prevent the case from
being tried and a verdict or judgment entered therein shall have
the same effect as if defendant had been present; and
(3) The court may exclude or excuse a defendant
from trial for good cause shown which may include tumultuous,
riotous, or obstreperous conduct.
Upon application of the prosecution, the court may require
the personal attendance of the defendant at the trial.
(b) Cases shall be set on the trial calendar to be tried in
the following order:
(1) misdemeanor cases when defendant is in custody;
(2) felony cases when defendant is in custody;
(3) felony cases when defendant is on bail or
recognizance; and
(4) misdemeanor cases when defendant is on bail or
recognizance.
(c) All felony cases shall be tried by jury unless the
defendant waives a jury in open court with the approval of the
court and the consent of the prosecution.
(d) All other cases shall be tried without a jury unless the
defendant makes written demand at least ten days prior to trial, or
the court orders otherwise. No jury shall be allowed in the trial
of an infraction.
(e) In all cases, the number of members of a trial jury shall
be as specified in Section 78-46-5, U.C.A. 1953.
(f) In all cases the prosecution and defense may, with the
consent of the accused and the approval of the court, by stipulation
in writing or made orally in open court, proceed to trial or
complete a trial then in progress with any number of jurors less
than otherwise required.
ix
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(g) After the jury has been impanelled and sworn, the trial
shall proceed in the following order:
(1) The charge shall be read and the plea of the
defendant stated;
(2) The prosecuting attorney may make an opening
statement and the defense may make an opening statement or
reserve it until the prosecution has rested;
(3) The prosecution shall offer evidence in support
of the charge;
(4) When the prosecution has rested, the defense
may present its case;
(5) Thereafter, the parties may offer only rebutting
evidence unless the court, for good cause, otherwise permits;
(6) When the evidence is concluded and at any other
appropriate time, the court shall instruct the jury; and
(7) Unless the cause is submitted to the jury on
either side or on both sides of the argument, the prosecution shall
open the argument, the defense shall follow and the prosecution
may close by responding to the defense argument. The court may
set reasonable limits upon the argument of counsel for each party
and the time to be allowed for argument.
(h) If a juror becomes ill, disabled or disqualified during
trial and an alternate juror has been selected, the case shall
proceed using the alternate juror. If no alternate has been
selected, the parties may stipulate to proceed with the number of
jurors remaining. Otherwise, the jury shall be discharged and a
new trial ordered.
(i) When in the opinion of the court it is proper for the
jury to view the place in which the offense is alleged to have been
committed, or in which any other material fact occurred, it may
order them to be conducted in a body under the charge of an
officer to the place, which shall be shown to them by some person
appointed by the court for that purpose. The officer shall be
sworn that while the jury are thus conducted, he will suffer no
person other than the person so appointed to speak to them nor
to do so himself on any subject connected with the trial and to
return them into court without unnecessary delay or at a specified
time.
(j) At each recess of the court, whether the jurors are
permitted to separate or be sequestered, they shall be admonished
by the court that it is their duty not to converse among themselves
or to converse with, or suffer themselves to be addressed by, any
other person on any subject of the trial, and that it is their duty
x
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not to form or express an opinion thereon until the case is finally
submitted to them.
(k) Upon retiring for deliberation, the jury may take with
them the instructions of the court and all exhibits and papers which
have been received as evidence, expect depositions; and each juror
may also take with him any notes of the testimony or other
proceedings taken by himself, but none taken by any other person.
(1) When the case is finally submitted to the jury, they shall
be kept together in some convenient place under charge of an
officer until they agree upon a verdict or are discharged, unless
otherwise ordered by the court. Except by order of the court, the
officer having them under his charge shall not allow any
communication to be made to them, or make any himself except
to ask them if they have agreed upon their verdict, and he shall
not, before the verdict is rendered, communicate to any person the
sate of their deliberations or the verdict agreed upon.
(m) After the jury has retired for deliberation, if they desire
to be informed on any point of law arising in the cause, they shall
inform the officer in charge of them, who shall communicate such
request to the court. The court may then direct that the jury be
brought before the court where, in the presence of the defendant
and both counsel, the court shall respond to the inquiry or advise
the jury that no further instructions shall be given. Such response
shall be recorded. The court may in its discretion respond to the
inquiry in writing without having the jury brought before the court,
in which case the inquiry and the response thereto shall be entered
in the record.
(n) If the verdict rendered by a jury is incorrect on its face,
it may be corrected by the jury under the advice of the court, or
the jury may be sent out again.
(o) At the conclusion of the evidence by the prosecution,
or at the conclusion of all the evidence, the court may issue an
order dismissing any information or indictment, or any count
thereof, upon the ground that the evidence is not legally sufficient
to establish the offense charged therein or any lesser included
offense.

xi
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
This is an appeal of a criminal conviction on June 28, 1990, in the Third
Circuit Court, Tooele City Department, the Honorable Edward A. Watson,
Circuit Judge presiding, following a bench trial of the defendant for the charge
of Driving or Being in Actual Physical Control of a Motor Vehicle While Under
the Influence of Alcohol, or Under the Influence of Drugs or a Combination of
Alcohol and Drugs to a Degree that the Defendant Could not Drive Safely, in
violation of Section 41-6-44 Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended, 1990.
Course of Proceedings
The Defendant was given a citation for Driving Under the Influence at
the time of his arrest on February 17, 1990. He was arraigned by the Circuit
Court on March 8, 1990. The trial was set at the time of the Arraignment for
March 29, 1990. At the time of trial, defendant appeared with counsel, Franklin
L. Slaugh, who moved for a continuance on the grounds that he had only had
four days to prepare, and had not yet interviewed important defense witnesses,
or seen the reports of the investigating and arresting officers (Motion to
Continue Transcript, p. 2, lines 12-19). The trial was continued to April 23,
1990, on the condition that it be a bench trial, and that defendant waive his jury
demand (Motion to Continue Transcript, p. 3, lines 15-20; p. 5, lines 1-7). The
1
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trial was held as scheduled, and the Court found the defendant guilty of being
in actual physical control of a motor vehicle, and dismissed count II, driving on
Suspension or Revocation, having found that the defendant had not driven the
vehicle in question (Trial Transcript p. 37, lines 18-21; p. 38, lines 9-13).
Defendant was to have been sentenced on May 21, 1990, but the presentence
report was not prepared as requested by the Court. The defendant also asked
that Attorney Slough resign, and a public defender be appointed to represent
him (Sentencing Transcript, p. 5, lines 10-13) The Court granted the request,
appointing Attorney Alan K. Jeppesen to represent the defendant further, and
continued the sentencing until June 8, 1990 (Sentencing Transcript p. 6, lines 1325).
Disposition of Trial Court
The trial judge sentenced the Defendant to one year in the Tooele County
Jail, and to pay a fine of $1,400.00, including surcharges and assessments. He
suspended the imposition of sentence and placed the defendant on probation on
certain conditions.

The Sentence was entered on June 28, 1990, and the

Defendant filed his appeal on July 27, 1990.
Relevant Facts
Defendant was arraigned on March 8, 1990. He informed the Court at
the time of arraignment that he had an appointment with Attorney Frank Slaugh
on March 24, 1990, and wanted to wait to enter a plea after talking to Attorney
Slaugh. (Arraignment Transcript, p. 4, lines 1-20). The Court entered a plea of
not guilty, and set the matter for trial on March 29, 1990, less than ten days
2
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after the Defendant's appointment with his attorney (Arraignment Transcript, p.
6, lines 3-18). When Attorney Slaugh appeared for the Defendant on March 29,
1990, he asked for a continuance, because he had not yet been able to examine
the Defendant's witnesses, or prepare for trial (Motion to Continue Transcript,
p.2, lines 12-24). The Court continued the trial, but with the understanding that
it would be a bench trial, because the defendant had not filed a timely Jury
Demand (Motion to Continue Transcript, p. 3, lines 15-20; p. 5, lines 1-6).
When the matter came before the court for Trial, the prosecution's
witness, Paul Shelton, who was the arresting officer, (Trial Transcript, p. 15, lines
24-25), testified that he could not specifically recall whether there was a wooden
frame around the bed of truck or not (Trial Transcript, p. 10, lines 12-22). This
evidence was important in determining whether the officer knew who was driving
the pickup when he observed what he thought was an erratic driving pattern.
The defendant called the passenger, Larry Lenzing, who testified that he
was driving the pickup when the officer pulled him over (Trial Transcript, p. 21,
lines 17-25; p. 22, lines 19-20; p. 23, lines 8-13). He also testified that there was
a plywood frame around the bed of the truck, and the windows and rear view
mirrors were dirty, so the officer could not have seen into the cab of the truck
to determine whether the two occupants traded places (Trial Transcript, p. 24,
lines 5-10). Upon the presentation of that evidence, the Defendant rested his
case. (Trial Transcript, p. 27, line 8).
On rebuttal, the State recalled Officer Shelton, who testified it did not
take him very long to reach the driver's window after the pickup stopped (Trial
Transcript, p. 29, lines 5-11).

He also said he could remember two people
3
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looking back at him from the cab of the truck as he pulled it over (Trial
Transcript p. 30, lines 2-6) and limited his lapse of memory regarding the
plywood frame, to just the sides of the bed.
Defendant called a surrebuttal witness, Mindy Argyle, (Trial Transcript,
p. 31, lines 4-16), who testified that on the date of the defendant's arrest, she
had driven the pickup truck and it had the plywood sides on both sides and the
front of the bed of the truck (Trial Transcript, p. 32, lines 13-16).
The State's evidence of intoxication to a degree that the defendant could
not drive safely, was the following:
(1) The officer observed the vehicle weave across a yellow center
line during the mile and one half that he followed it (Trial Transcript p. 6, lines
18-20).
(2) The vehicle slowed down to "quite a slow speed and then it
proceeded to pick the speed back up for about a mile" (Trial Transcript p. 6,
lines 20-22).
(3) The vehicle crossed over the outside white traffic lane as it
went around a curve towards the interstate highway (Trial Transcript, p. 8, lines
6-9).
(4) The odor of alcohol was observed on defendant's breath when
the officer approached the vehicle, (Trial Transcript, p. 11, lines 12, 16-19).
(5) The defendant's speech was slurred. (Trial Transcript p. 11,
line 12).
(6) The defendant could not find his driver's license or registration
(Trial Transcript, p. 11, lines 13-14).
4
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(7)

Defendant admitted to having had a few beers, (Trial

Transcript p. 11, line 25, p. 12, lines 1-3.
(8) The defendant lost his balance on the third and ninth steps
of a heel to toe test (Trial Transcript p. 14, lines 26).
(9) He did not count in sequence, and lost his balance on a one
leg stand test (Trial Transcript p. 14, lines 21-25).
(10)

He miscounted or "couldn't get his right fingers together."

on a finger count test (Trial Transcript, p. 15, lines 4-8).
The trial judge found the defendant guilty of being in actual physical
control of a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol (Trial Transcript
p. 37, lines 6-25; p. 38, lines 1-8). He found the defendant not guilty of Driving
on Suspension, because reasonable doubt existed as to whether the defendant
was driving or not (Trial Transcript, p. 38, lines 9-13).

SUMMARY OF DEFENDANTS ARGUMENT
Point One
The State failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt each element of the
crime of D.U.I., because it failed to prove that the defendant was under the
influence of alcohol.

While the driving pattern may have given the officer

probable cause to stop the defendant's vehicle, he was not the driver, and that
same driving pattern is not admissible to prove he was intoxicated to a degree
he could not drive safely. There was no evidence of blood alcohol at the time
of driving. The only evidence upon which to base the defendant's conviction is
his physical characteristics and performance of the field sobriety tests.
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Point Two
The defendant submits as a second ground of reversal that his
fundamental, constitutional right to a trial by jury1 was denied him. Forcing
defendant to waive that right because the Jury Demand was not timely, was in
this instance, improper, because the Court was well aware that defendant's
appointment with counsel was less than ten days before the date the Court set
for trial. The trial was set at the time of the arraignment, and the Court knew
when it set the trial from the bench that the defendant's attorney would have
less than ten days to prepare for trial after the initial conference (Arraignment
Transcript p. 6, lines 3-7).

Defendant's counsel was then in a position wherein

he was unprepared for trial on the date set, and was told by the prosecutor that
the only way he could get a continuance was to waive the jury demand (Motion
to Continue Transcript p. 3, lines 15-20).

See f.n. 6, State v. Moosman, 794 P.2d 474 (Utah Sp.Ct., 1990): WU. S. Const, amend. VI; Utah Const, art. I,
Section 10; see generally Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968); Mel Hardman Productions, Inc. v. Robinson, 604 P.2d
913 (Utah, 1979); State v. James, 30 Utah 2d 32, 512 P.2d 1031 (Utah, 1973); Flynn v. W. P. Harlin Constr. Co., 29 Utah
2d 327, 509 P.2d 356 (1973).
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DETAIL OF ARGUMENT
POINT ONE
THE STATE FAILED TO CARRY ITS BURDEN
OF PROOF
TO
PROVE
BEYOND
A
REASONABLE DOUBT THAT DEFENDANT
COULD NOT DRIVE SAFELY BECAUSE OF
INTOXICATION
In order for defendant to prevail on the argument that the State failed to
carry its burden of proof of intoxication to a degree that the defendant could
not drive safely, the evidence must be so insubstantial or inconclusive that
reasonable minds must have entertained a reasonable doubt that the defendant
committed the crime charged.2

This case is not one of contradictory testimony

on the point of defendant's intoxication to a degree that he could not drive
safely, as in State v. Carlson,3 it is a case in which convincing evidence of
intoxication to a degree that the defendant could not drive safely, was wholly
lacking.
None of the evidence presented was persuasive of the defendant's inability
to safely drive.
A basic rule with respect to conviction of crime is
that there must be some basis in the evidence upon
which the fact trier (court or jury) could fairly and
reasonably believe that the state had proved every
essential element of the offense beyond a reasonable

State v. Dyer, 671 P.2d 142, 148-149 (Utah Sp.Ct., 1983).
3
638 P.2d 512, 514 (Utah, Sp. Ct., 1981): The presentation of conflicting evidence does not preclude a finding
of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt."
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doubt; and unless that test is met, a conviction is not
justified.4
The defendant cannot be convicted of D.U.I, on his admission of the
consumption of alcohol, nor upon his slurred speech. It was almost midnight
when he was arrested. There is nothing to suggest the slurred speech was the
result of alcohol consumption. Furthermore, there is nothing to suggest that the
defendant could not drive safely simply because he lost his balance on the third
and ninth steps while walking heel to toe, or in failing to touch each finger
correctly while counting. There was no breath test, no blood test, no driving
pattern to determine the defendant's level of intoxication, and the field sobriety
tests simply do not overcome the burden of the State on the element of
intoxication to a degree the defendant could not drive safely. In light of the
insubstantial evidence on the intoxication to a degree that the defendant could
not drive safely element of the D.U.I, charge, the State failed to carry its burden
of proof and the defendant should have been acquitted.
POINT TWO
THE
COURT
ERRED
IN
DEFENDANT A JURY TRIAL

DENYING

Rule 17(d) of the Rules of Criminal Procedure provides that a defendant
has no right to a jury trial unless he makes a request for a jury at least ten days
before the trial date.5 The trial court abused its discretion in setting the trial
within that ten day period when the court knew in advance that the defendant's
4

State v. Granato, 610 P.2d 1290, 1292 (Utah, 1980).

Formerly 77-35-17 U.C.A., 1953. "All other cases shall be tried without a jury unless the defendant makes written
demand at least ten days prior to trial, or the court orders otherwise.
. . . "
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